Compare plurality, ranked-choice, Borda count, Condorcet, and approval voting. See how different methods produce different winners.
This simulator tallies one set of ballots under five voting rules: plurality, ranked-choice (instant runoff), Borda count, Condorcet, and approval voting. Enter how each voter ranks the candidates, or which ones they approve, and the tool shows who wins under each rule. Since every method runs on the same ballots, any difference in outcome comes from the rule itself. What surprises most users: ranked-choice voting does not crown the first-round leader. It eliminates the weakest candidate and transfers those ballots, so a first-round leader can still lose. No method here is 'the correct one' - each encodes a different idea of what voters want.
A concrete input and expected output from the current implementation.
Input
5 voters: A > B > C 4 voters: C > B > A 2 voters: B > C > A
Expected output
Plurality: A wins with 5 of 11 first-choice votes. Borda count (2-1-0 points): B 13, A 10, C 10 - B wins. Ranked-choice: B is eliminated first with 2 votes, both ballots transfer to C, and C beats A 6-5 in the final round - C wins. Condorcet: B beats A 6-5 and C 7-4 - B wins.
The same 11 ballots produce three different winners - A under plurality, C under ranked choice, and B under both Borda and Condorcet - because each rule reads the ballots differently. A leads on first choices but loses both head-to-head matchups; C wins by picking up B's transferred ballots.
Plurality counts only each ballot's first choice. Borda assigns points by rank (2, 1, 0 for three candidates) and sums them. Ranked choice eliminates the candidate with the fewest first-choice votes and transfers those ballots to each voter's next preference, repeating until someone holds a majority. Condorcet runs every pair head-to-head. Approval sums how many voters marked each candidate. All five run on the same entered ballots.
Each rule answers a different question. Plurality asks who has the strongest first-choice support. Borda asks who is broadly acceptable across all ranks. Ranked choice asks who can build a majority as weak candidates drop out. Condorcet asks who wins every head-to-head. Approval asks who the widest coalition will tolerate. The same ballots can produce different winners, none of them wrong: each rule returns the answer to its own question.
None of them is objectively fairest. Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that with three or more candidates, no ranked voting method can satisfy even a small set of basic fairness criteria simultaneously. The practical approach is different: decide which behavior matters to your group - majority rule, consensus, or resistance to tactical voting - then use this tool to see which method produces outcomes you can live with.
Because instant runoff and Borda count are sensitive to which candidates appear on the ballot. Adding a fringe candidate can change who is eliminated first, which in turn changes whose ballots get transferred and who survives to the final round. This spoiler-like sensitivity is a property of the methods, not an error in your entry - it is the kind of effect this tool exists to reveal.
The example and behavioral notes were checked against the browser implementation. Standards and primary references below define the relevant format, formula, or platform behavior.
Calculate percentages, percentage change, and what percent one number is of another with step-by-step breakdowns.
Calculate tips and split bills between multiple people with customizable tip percentages and rounding options.
Calculate monthly payments, total interest, and generate amortization schedules for loans and mortgages.
Calculate Body Mass Index from height and weight with category classification and healthy range guidance.
Calculate sale prices, savings amounts, and final costs after single or stacked percentage discounts.
Compute mean, median, mode, standard deviation, variance, and other descriptive statistics from a data set.